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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is a dispute over the interpretation of a 
regulation governing the amount of insurance coverage provided 
for federally insured joint accounts in a failed savings and loan 
association.  At issue is whether the funds in joint accounts are 
insured as a single unit or as multiple units and, specifically, 
whether the two holders of several joint accounts are insured for 
up to $100,000 or for up to $200,000.  Plaintiffs, Raymond and 
Kathleen Sekula, contend the regulation provides that each of 
them is insured for up to $100,000 for funds held in their joint 
accounts and that together they are insured for up to $200,000.  
Defendants, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") 
and the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC"), maintain the 
regulation limits the insurance to an aggregated $100,000 
maximum.  The district court agreed with the FDIC/RTC (hereafter 
 
 
RTC), and granted summary judgment to the agency.1  The Sekulas 
appealed.  We will affirm the district court. 
                     
1.  The district court granted summary judgment to the RTC, 
holding that five of the Sekulas' six accounts should be 
aggregated and insured to a total of $100,000.  The court denied 
summary judgment with respect to the sixth account, a certificate 
of deposit, directing the appellees to hold a hearing as to the 
ownership of that account.  Disposition of that dispute is not 




 On November 15, 1991, the Office of Thrift Supervision 
declared Atlantic Financial Savings, F.A. insolvent and appointed 
the RTC as receiver.  The RTC has the responsibility for 
resolving the financial affairs of failed savings and loan 
institutions.  12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(3) (Supp. V 1993).  In 
carrying out its duties, the RTC has the same powers the FDIC has 
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("the Act"), 12 U.S.C. § 
1821 (Supp. V 1993).2  It can approve or reject claims for 
insured deposits and determine the amount of insurance to which 
depositors are entitled under the Act.  Under that authority, the 
RTC identified the eligible insured accounts at Atlantic 
Financial on the date it failed and paid insurance on what it 
calculated to be the insured portion of the accounts. 
 The Sekulas held six accounts at Atlantic Financial 
when the institution was declared insolvent.  Each contained a 
signature card designated in the name of "Raymond F. Sekula or L. 
                     
2.  Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform and 
Recovery Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 
183 (1989) (codified at various locations in 12 U.S.C.) as a 
response to the crisis in the savings and loan industry that drew 
so much public attention in recent years.  It was designed to 
improve the existing regulatory scheme and one of its purposes 
was to establish a new corporation, the RTC, to contain, manage, 
and resolve failed savings associations.  The RTC in large part 
took over the former role of the FDIC which, in turn, took on new 
duties, including the functions of the Federal Savings and Loan 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, which was ended.  See Rosa v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991); 1 Gregory Pulles et al., Firrea, 
Introduction (Supp. 1993).  At oral argument, counsel for 
appellees stated that the RTC and the FDIC spoke with one voice 
on the issues in this case.   
 
 
Kathleen Sekula" or "L. Kathleen Sekula or Raymond F. Sekula."  
No other persons had ownership interests in the accounts.  The 
total amount in the six accounts was $169,717.52, distributed as 
follows: 
 Number    Balance   
 00000132006597   $ 2,015.48 
 00000357968841    32,691.51 
 00000354131716    12,147.83 
 00000357236116    15,174.67 
 00000357658160    50,105.82 
 90000356560995    57,582.21 
 Total    169,717.52 
The RTC maintained that only $100,000 of the total $169,717.52 
was insured, and that Raymond and Kathleen were therefore 
entitled to $100,000 in the aggregate, which it paid them.  The 
Sekulas contended the entire amount was insured because they each 
were entitled to receive up to $100,000 for their loss from the 
insured accounts -- up to an aggregate of $200,000.3  
 II. 
 On the date Atlantic Financial was declared insolvent, 
the relevant statute on aggregating deposits provided: 
                     
3.  The RTC initially treated all six accounts as joint accounts, 
although the Sekulas claimed two of the accounts were actually 
single ownership accounts, one belonging to Raymond Sekula and 
one to Kathleen Sekula.  They contended those two accounts should 
have been insured separately for up to $100,000 each.  The matter 
was unresolved at the time of appeal, but a hearing had been 
scheduled.  At oral argument, counsel for the Sekulas informed 
the court that the amount in dispute in this appeal had been 
reduced to $13,000 as a result of the hearing.  We shall proceed, 
however, as if all the accounts were joint accounts; the amount 
in dispute does not affect our interpretation of the regulation. 
 
 
[I]n determining the amount due to any 
depositor there shall be added together all 
deposits in the depository institution 
maintained in the same capacity and the same 
right for his benefit either in his own name 
or in the names of others . . . . 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1988).4  Congress gave the FDIC the power 
to promulgate regulations governing the determination of net 
amounts due to depositors for deposits in insured depository 
institutions: 
For the purpose of clarifying and defining 
the insurance coverage under this subsection 
and subsection (i) of section 1817 . . . the 
[FDIC] is authorized to define, with such 
classifications and exceptions as it may 
prescribe, terms used in those subsections . 
. . and the extent of insurance coverage 
resulting therefrom. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1988).  Accordingly, Congress delegated 
authority to the FDIC (and its successor the RTC) to define the 
Act in promulgating the regulations and to apply them. The RTC's 
determination of the Sekulas' deposit insurance coverage is 
                     
4.  The current version of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
provides: 
 
 For the purpose of determining the net 
amount due to any depositor under [12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(a)(1)(B)], the Corporation shall 
aggregate the amounts of all deposits in the 
insured depository institution which are 
maintained by a depositor in the same 
capacity and the same right for the benefit 
of the depositor . . . . 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1993). 
 
 
governed by those regulations promulgated by the FDIC pursuant to 
12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1988)5 and set forth in 12 C.F.R. Part 
330.   
 The regulation in question, 12 C.F.R. § 330.7(b) 
(1991), directs how insurance is to be calculated for joint 
accounts.  It provides:  
 (b) Determination of insurance coverage.  All 
qualifying joint accounts owned by the same 
combination of individuals shall first be 
added together and insured up to $100,000 in 
the aggregate.  The interests of each co-
owner in all qualifying joint accounts, 
whether owned by the same or different 
combinations of persons, shall then be added 
together and the total shall be insured up to 
$100,000. 
12 C.F.R. § 330.7(b) (1991).6  The RTC interpreted this 
regulation to limit the Sekulas' insured aggregate to $100,000.   
                     
5.  The Sekulas suggest that because this statute has been 
changed, the RTC's interpretation is entitled to no deference, 
but they do not say why and cite no authority.  As the district 
court noted, the 1991 FDIC Improvement Act substantially 
reenacted the statutory scheme regarding the aggregation of a 
depositor's accounts for determining the net amount of insurance 
due each depositor.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (as amended 1991).  
We see no substantial change in the relevant statutory 
provisions.  
6.  Subsection (a) of 12 C.F.R. § 330.7 describes the insurance 
coverage for qualifying joint accounts separately from that for 
individually held accounts.  Subsection (c) discusses how 
accounts qualify, and (d) describes how joint accounts are 
treated if they do not qualify.  Finally, subsection (e) deems 
the interests of co-owners of joint accounts to be equal unless 
otherwise stated in the insured depository institution's deposit 
account records. 
    The wording of the current edition of 12 C.F.R. § 330.7 is 
identical to that of the 1991 edition. 
 
 
 The Sekulas raise two principal issues on appeal.  
First, they contend the proper interpretation of the language of 
the regulation provides each of them up to $100,000 insurance 
coverage on their jointly held accounts -- and, consequently, 
that the entire amount on deposit in their joint accounts was 
insured.  Second, they claim the RTC's interpretation of the 
regulation constitutes substantive rule-making and is invalid 
because it was not promulgated in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) and (c) (1988).  
They also claim that promulgation of an alleged substantive 
change affecting their rights without affording them notice and 
an opportunity for comment as required by the APA denied them due 
process of law. 
 Neither in their notice of appeal nor in their brief 
have the Sekulas explicitly contested the RTC's interpretation of 
the statute requiring aggregation of deposits.  What the Sekulas 
have expressly challenged is the fidelity of the RTC's method of 
calculation to the language of its regulation.  Nevertheless, it 
is apparent from the thrust of their argument that they also 
implicitly challenge the RTC's implementation of its statutory 
directive.  
 III. 
 A. Review of Agency's Regulation. 
 When reviewing an agency's construction of a statute, 
if the intent of Congress is clear, then we must give effect to 
 
 
that intent.  Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  If the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, then a 
deference standard applies, and the question for the court 
becomes whether the agency's answer is based on a reasonable 
construction of the statute.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  In 
determining whether an agency's regulation complies with its 
congressional mandate, we look to see whether the regulation 
harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, 
and its purpose.  National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United 
States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).  So long as the regulation 
bears a fair relationship to the language of the statute, 
reflects the views of those who sought its enactment, and matches 
the purpose they articulated, it will merit deference.  National 
Muffler Dealers, 440 U.S. at 484.   
 The statute, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1), does not 
explicitly provide that joint deposit account holders are to be 
treated and limited as a single depositor.  Accordingly, we must 
examine whether the agency's regulation, and its interpretation, 
comport with the general congressional directive.  Because 
congressional intent to aggregate jointly held deposits and limit 
insurance of that aggregate is apparent from the legislative 
history behind the enactment, the RTC's interpretation is based 
on a reasonable construction of the statute.7 
                     
7.  Although we believe the intent of Congress is clear, it also 
is true that Congress has not spoken to "the precise question at 
 
 
 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) directs the RTC to aggregate 
deposits:  
`insured deposit' [or] net amount due to any 
depositor . . .  shall be determined 
according to such regulations as the [RTC] 
may prescribe, and in determining the amount 
due to any depositor there shall be added 
together all deposits in the depository 
institution maintained in the same capacity 
and the same right for his benefit either in 
his own name or in the names of others . . . 
. 
   
12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(1) (1988).  The legislative history behind 
the subsection reveals that the incorporation of section 
1813(m)(1) into the statute was intended to prevent a single 
depositor from exceeding the statutory ceiling on insurance 
coverage through other means.  The notion that holders of a joint 
account would be insured as a single entity was integral to the 
deposit insurance scheme from the beginning.8  By the mid-1960s, 
however, there were significant problems with the administration 
of the federal bank deposit insurance program.  Depositors were 
becoming increasingly adept at evading the limits Congress had 
set on deposit insurance.9  Accordingly, Congress overhauled the 
(..continued) 
issue."  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.  We normally grant deference 
to the agency's regulation where Congress has "left a gap for the 
agency to fill," by an express delegation of regulatory 
authority, Chevron 467 U.S. at 843-44.   The problem here, 
however, as we shall see, is that the regulation itself is 
ambiguous.   
8.  See K.E. Scott, Some Answers to Account Insurance Problems,  
23 The Business Lawyer 493 (1968). 
9.  In one infamous case, the FSLIC discovered four husband-wife 
couples who had established 50 different accounts, each held by a 
 
 
statute, directing the bank insurance agencies to develop 
regulations that:    
would enable the insuring agencies to bar the 
use of devices such as numerous joint 
accounts in various combinations . . . to 
obtain insurance far in excess of the limits 
established by Congress. 
 
112 Cong. Rec. 26,472-73 (1966) (statement of Senator Robertson).  
See also 112 Cong. Rec. 25,007 (1966) (statement of Congressman 
Ashley) ("[T]he purpose of my amendment [subsection 1813(m)(1)] 
is to clarify the power of the insuring agencies to prevent the 
circumvention of the insurance limit by the device of multiple 
accounts in the same institution.")     
 The agency implemented its statutory directive by 
promulgating the regulatory scheme, establishing four categories 
of accounts:  single deposit, testamentary, joint, and trust 
accounts.  Within each of those categories, depositors' insurance 
coverage was capped at the statutory maximum.   The regulations 
provide that in the joint account category any combination of 
individuals holding joint accounts is subject to the statutory 
limit and any individual participating in joint accounts with 
different combinations of individuals is likewise limited by the 
cap.10 
(..continued) 
different combination of the eight people.  Because eight people 
could generate 247 different combinations of joint accounts, it 
would have been possible for those four couples to insure over 
$3.7 million by use of joint accounts.  Scott, supra, at 499. 
10.  See Scott, supra, at 504-08. 
 
 
 Unfortunately, the RTC's regulation is marred by a 
textual ambiguity.  There is more than one plausible reading of 
the regulation -- one offered by the RTC and another by the 
Sekulas -- and neither is immediately evident from the words 
themselves.  Only the RTC's reading, however, is consistent with 
the intent and purpose of the statute, as revealed by the text 
and the legislative history. 
   The ambiguity arises because of the phrase "the same or 
different combinations of persons," in the second sentence of 
subsection (b) of the regulation.  See 12 C.F.R. § 330.7(b) 
(1991).  According to the RTC, subsection (b) provides insurance 
up to the maximum of $100,000 for the aggregate of deposits of 
joint account holders.  Thus, the second sentence of the 
subsection recognizes that to prevent an individual exceeding the 
statutory limit in the joint account category, his interests in 
joint accounts held with different combinations of individuals 
must be aggregated and the total must be capped at $100,000.  The 
Sekulas, on the other hand, contend that the use of the word 
"same" in the second sentence explicitly provides insurance 
coverage for their individual interests in all joint accounts in 
which they participate.11   
 B. Interpretation of the Regulation.   
                     
11.  The Sekulas have not addressed the problems raised by the 




 Generally, we defer to an agency's consistent 
interpretation of its own regulation unless it is "plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."  Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock and Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).  
Nevertheless, "this deference does not permit us to defer to an 
`interpretation' . . . that strains `the plain and natural 
meaning of words . . . ."  Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1324 (3d Cir. 
1987), and is "tempered by our duty to independently insure that 
the agency's interpretation comports with the language it has 
adopted."  Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. 
Gardner, 882 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 The difficulty here is that the legislative regulation 
is ambiguous.  If the regulation were clear and comported with  
the statutory directive, then, as a legislative rule, it would be 
entitled to deference.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.  Because the 
regulation is unclear, however, we will look to the agency's 
interpretation of its regulation and ascertain whether it is 
compatible with the intent of Congress.  We also will examine the 
regulation in view of the accepted standards of statutory 
construction.12  In reviewing an agency's interpretation of its 
                     
12.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 ("If a court, employing 
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that 
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that 
intention is the law and must be given effect.") 
 
 
ambiguously worded regulation, we grant less deference than 
otherwise.13 
 1. 
 In making its determination, the RTC applied its 
regulation as follows:  implementing the first sentence, it added 
all the Sekulas' qualifying joint accounts and determined that 
the total was $169,717.52, of which only $100,000 was insured;  
there was no need to apply the second sentence because the funds 
here were held by the same combination of persons as in step one 
and neither co-owner had ownership interests in joint accounts 
involving third parties.  There was no possibility that either of 
the Sekulas would exceed the statutory maximum in the joint 
account category. 
 By contrast, the Sekulas contend the proper application 
of the regulation is that, first, their joint accounts are 
totaled and insured in the amount of $100,000.  Then, the 
interests each of them has in all joint qualifying accounts he or 
                     
13.  We noted in International Raw Materials v. Stauffer Chemical 
Co., 978 F.2d 1318, 1325 n.9 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 
S.Ct. 1588 (1993), that we had not decided whether Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843-44, which counselled judicial deference to an 
agency's legislative rules, overruled General Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), which held that an agency's 
interpretive decisions demanded less judicial deference.  The 
distinction relates to agency interpretations which are not made 
in the context of legislative rule-making.  See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 
2093-94 (1990).  Because the agency here made an interpretation 
in the context of legislative rule-making, we need not decide 
whether the Gilbert standard survives.  Cf. Reich v. Local 30, 
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 6 F.3d 978 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
 
she holds are totaled and each person's cumulative interests also 
are insured in the amount of $100,000.  The Sekulas claim this 
calculation recognizes that each of them has a half interest of 
$84,858.76 in their joint accounts (or a total of $167,717.52) 
and all of that amount is covered.  The problem with this 
approach, however, is that it requires elision of part of the 
regulation and ignores the plain intent of the statutory 
directive. 
 2. 
 The Sekulas claim to rely on the plain meaning rule in 
order to harvest the maximum coverage from the regulation.14  To 
reach their desired result they claim to give plain meaning to 
every word of the regulation's second sentence, which states, 
"the interests of each co-owner in all qualifying joint accounts, 
whether owned by the same or different combinations of persons," 
shall be added and insured up to $100,000.15  The Sekulas 
                     
14.  The plain meaning rule is the basic principle of statutory 
construction.  "[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first 
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, 
and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to 
enforce it according to its terms."  Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).  While the rule is one of statutory 
construction, it also has been applied to agency regulations.  
See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. 
Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1324 (3d Cir. 1987); Bethlehem Steel 
Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 
157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978).   
 
15.  The interests to be totaled in this step are not explicitly 
identified as insured or uninsured interests, and the Sekulas 
contend that the word "interests" must therefore be taken to mean 
all the interests, without qualification, that each of them has 
 
 
particularly focus on the word "same" in this sentence.  
According to their reading, the word "same" compels the 
conclusion that the individual's interest in all joint accounts 
is insured for $100,000 and that the RTC's interpretation ignores 
this word.  In contrast to their rigorous reading of the second 
sentence, however, the Sekulas ignore the first sentence of the 
regulation, which requires that "all joint deposit accounts owned 
by the same combination of individuals" shall be aggregated and 
insured only up to the statutory limit.   
 Another fundamental rule of construction is that effect 
must be given to every part of a statute or regulation, so that 
no part will be meaningless.  One must look at the entire 
provision, rather than seize on one part in isolation.16 
(..continued) 
in all qualifying joint accounts.  The RTC contends that we must 
limit the interests included in the second step's calculation to 
those interests that would qualify for insurance under the first 
step.  Although we believe that, in the context of the statute 
and of other parts of the regulations, step two does presume that 
the term "interests" means "insured interests," we need not rely 
on that factor because we agree with the RTC's interpretation on 
other grounds.  
16.  "Words . . . have only a communal existence; . . . the 
meaning of each interpenetrate[s] the other, . . ."  National 
Labor Relations Bd. v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 
1941); see also King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570, 574 
(1991) ("the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends 
on context"); Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v. United 
States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 928 F.2d 1378, 1385 
(3d Cir. 1991) (courts should avoid a construction that renders 
any provision superfluous) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 
U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).  When possible, every word should be 
given effect "so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, 
void or insignificant."  Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare, 
928 F.2d at 1385 (quoting  Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland 
Statutory Construction, § 46.06 (5th Ed. 1992)).    
 
 
Our task is to give effect to all parts of the regulation, 
without trampling on the plain meaning of the words.  Under the 
Sekulas' interpretation, the first sentence of the regulation 
would serve no purpose and the determination under that sentence 
that all joint accounts owned by them are aggregated and insured 
up to $100,000 would be inconsequential.  According to the 
Sekulas, the second sentence requires the RTC to insure each of 
them for $100,000 for their individual interests in their joint 
accounts.  By that reading, either the second sentence supplants 
insurance coverage calculated under the first sentence or it 
gives holders of joint accounts multiple insurance coverage on 
those accounts.  Neither alternative is reasonable.  The first 
alternative would collapse into one step what is clearly meant to 
be a two-step process under the regulation.  The second 
alternative would violate the clear intent of the regulatory 
scheme:  to limit the insurable interests of holders of joint 
accounts.  We cannot find a way to give meaning to the first step 
of the regulation other than by limiting the application of step 
two to individuals who hold joint accounts with different 
combinations of persons.  
 In fact, the word "same," in the second sentence, was 
only inserted in the 1991 edition of the regulation.  The second 
sentence of the prior regulation referred only to accounts owned 
by "different combinations of individuals."17  The RTC points out 
                     
17.  The pre-1991 regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 330.9, which first 
appeared in the 1988 C.F.R., used two sub-sections to describe 
 
 
the word was inserted merely to state the existing rule more 
clearly -- that a person's insured interests in joint accounts 
owned with the "same" combination of persons as in step one are, 
in step two, aggregated with the insured interests in any joint 
accounts he or she holds with different combinations of persons.  
The individual's insurable interest in this aggregate is likewise 
limited by the statutory cap.  Thus, no individual may receive 
more than $100,000 of insurance coverage in the joint account 
category.   Although we recognize the ambiguity the word "same" 
creates, we believe that the addition was a technical change that 
clarified the existing rule, but did not change insurance 
coverage.18  We are convinced that rather than change the meaning 
(..continued) 
the two-step process that is described in one sub-section in the 
later version of the regulation.  Subsections (d) and (e) state:  
 
  (d) Same combination of individuals.  
All joint deposit accounts owned by the same 
combination of individuals shall first be 
added together and insured up to $100,000 in 
the aggregate. 
 
  (e) Interest of each coowner.  The 
interest of each coowner in all joint deposit 
accounts owned by different combinations of 
individuals shall then be added together and 
insured up to $100,000 in the aggregate.   
12 C.F.R. § 330.9(d) and (e) (1990). 
18.  The RTC's interpretation was promulgated under the prior 
version.   Thus, the Sekulas argue that the interpretation is now 
invalid.  Because we do not believe that the addition of the word 
"same" changed the meaning of the regulation, we do not find that 
it compromises the RTC's interpretation. 
 
 
of the regulation, the addition of the word "same" was meant to 
cause the wording of the regulation to reflect more clearly the 
RTC's longstanding interpretation of the way the insurance on 
joint accounts is to be calculated. 
 3. 
 The FDIC and RTC have consistently applied the joint 
account regulation in the manner they describe.  Since 
promulgation of the regulatory scheme, the RTC and its 
predecessors have interpreted the regulations to require the 
aggregate of all accounts held jointly by the same two persons to 
be insured to the same extent as the aggregate of all accounts 
held by a single person.  See Mahoney v. Federal Sav. and Loan 
Ins. Corp., 393 F.2d 156 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 837 
(1968).  Indeed, all the published cases, advisory opinions, and 
published examples are in accord with the RTC's interpretation 
and demonstrate a consistent application of the joint account 
regulation.    
 Furthermore, this interpretation is consistent with the 
general principle that joint accounts are considered to be owned 
collectively and insured as a single unit.  This principle is 
enunciated in the regulations, at 12 C.F.R. § 330.3(a) (1991): 
The insurance coverage provided by the Act 
and the regulations in this part is based 
upon the ownership rights and capacities in 
which deposit accounts are maintained at 
insured depository institutions.  All 
deposits in an insured depository institution 
which are maintained in the same right and 
capacity (by or for the benefit of a 
particular depositor or depositors) shall be 
 
 
added together and insured in accordance with 
the regulations in this part.  Deposits 
maintained in different rights and 
capacities, as recognized under this part, 
shall be insured separately from each other. 
Indeed, since the inception of the deposit insurance program, 
joint accounts have been considered to be owned collectively and 
insured as a single unit.19  Other federal courts have recognized 
and upheld the principle as axiomatic to the federal deposit 
insurance scheme.  See, e.g., Kershaw v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
987 F.2d 1206, 1208-09 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting as unsupported 
by 12 C.F.R. § 330.7 argument of husband and wife jointly holding 
three CD's totalling more than $150,000 that regulation should be 
construed to insure interests of each spouse up to $100,000); 
Mahoney, 393 F.2d at 158 (joint accounts "constituted a single 
'member' entity, so that the $10,000 maximum applied to the 
aggregate of the three accounts.").  
 We find it particularly significant that the agency's 
interpretation of the regulation is contained in a question-and-
answer booklet they disseminated to financial institutions for 
                     
19.  See, e.g., testimony of Judge L.E. Birdzell, General Counsel 
for the FDIC, testifying before the House Banking and Currency 
Committee in 1935:  "as long as the account is in the name of the 
husband and wife, no matter what the amount is, it is treated as 
one deposit . . . ."  Hearings on the Banking Act of 1935, H.R. 
5357:  A Bill to Provide for the Sound, Effective, and 
Uninterrupted Operation of the Banking System, and for Other 
Purposes, Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of 




distribution to the public.20  The passage quoted below dates 
prior to the 1991 insertion of the word "same."  It was used by 
the FDIC's predecessor, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation, to explain a prior regulation on joint accounts, 12 
C.F.R. § 564.9(d) and (e) (1987); it was used to explain the 1988 
version, quoted above; and it is used today to explain the 
version that appeared in the 1991 edition of the C.F.R.  The RTC 
claims the booklet passage has not changed because the prior 
versions of the regulation are identical in meaning to the 
present version. 
 The passage paraphrases the steps for determining 
deposit insurance for multiple joint accounts in answer to the 
question "How are joint accounts insured?":  
 1. First, all joint accounts that are 
identically owned (i.e. held by the same 
combination of individuals) are added 
together and the combined total is insurable 
up to the $100,000 maximum. 
 
 2. After step one has been completed, joint 
accounts involving different combinations of 
individuals are reviewed to determine the 
amount of each person's insurable interest 
(or share) in all joint accounts.  Each 
owner's insurable interest in all joint 
accounts is added together and the total is 
                     
20.  The booklet, which has appeared under various titles, 
including "Your Insured Deposit," answers the question "How are 
joint accounts insured?"  It states the two steps are applied so 
that "(1) no one joint account can be insured for over $100,000, 
(2) multiple joint accounts with identical ownership cannot be 
insured for over $100,000 in the aggregate, and (3) no one 
person's insured interest in the joint account category can 
exceed $100,000."  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Your 
Insured Deposit (1993) (emphasis added). 
 
 
insured up to the $100,000 maximum.  Each 
person's interest in a joint account is 
deemed equal unless otherwise stated on the 
deposit account records.   
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Your Insured Deposit 
(1993).  In the booklet's example,  A and B share joint accounts 
with each other and separately have interests in joint accounts 
held with other individuals.  Step one regards A and B as one 
depositor, entitled to a maximum of $100,000 insurance on 
deposits held in those joint accounts.  Then, in step two, A's 
and B's individual interests in that insured amount are broken 
out.  These interests -- which may total $50,000 apiece -- are 
added to A's and B's insured interests in joint accounts held 
with other people.  This step assures that for each individual 
that aggregate of insured interests may not exceed the $100,000 
maximum.   
 As the district court found, these pamphlets were made 
available to the public.  We agree that a person "proceeding in 
good faith should not be subjected to a trap brought about by an 
interpretation of a regulation hidden in the bosom of the 
agency."  Gardner, 882 F.2d at 71 (quoting Mangifest, 826 F.2d at 
1325).  But there is no "trap" when the agency's interpretation 
of a regulation is public and long-standing.   
     4. 
 We have consistently recognized that: 
The responsibility to promulgate clear and 
unambiguous standards is upon the Secretary.  
The test is not what he might possibly have 
intended, but what he said.  If the language 
 
 
is faulty, the Secretary has the means and 
the obligation to amend. 
 
Bethlehem Steel v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 
573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978);  See also Mangifest, 826 F.2d 
at 1324.  We agree the language of the regulation is ambiguous.  
Nevertheless, it has posed no trap for the unwary.  The agency's 
interpretation and application have been consistent with the 
statute and the legislative purpose and joint account holders 
have not been misled about the impact of the regulation on their 
deposit insurance.  Accordingly, because the regulation's meaning 
can be satisfactorily established by applying standard principles 
of statutory construction and by referring to the agency's 
interpretation, which is long-standing and consistent, we 
conclude that the regulation limits insurance for joint account 
deposits to a maximum of $100,000.21    
 IV. 
 A.  Rule-Making Procedures. 
 The Sekulas contend the agency's interpretation of 12 
C.F.R. § 330.7(b) is itself a legislative or substantive rule and 
therefore is invalid because it was not promulgated in accordance 
with provisions of the APA requiring notice and an opportunity to 
comment, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).  But those procedures are 
                     
21.  While the meaning of the regulation is satisfactorily 
established by textual analysis and the agencies' long-standing 
application and interpretation of it, we hope in the future the 





required only if a substantive change is proposed and do not 
apply to "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or 
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice."  5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b)(A) (1988).  Interpretive rules constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance.  Interpretive rules are not 
intended to alter legal rights, but to state the agency's view of 
what existing law requires.   Such rules "merely clarify or 
explain existing law or regulations."  Southern California Edison 
Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 770 F.2d 779, 783 (9th 
Cir. 1985).   "If the rule in question merely clarifies or 
explains existing law or regulations, it will be deemed 
interpretive."  Bailey v. Sullivan, 885 F.2d 52, 62 (3d Cir. 
1989).   
 Section 330.7(b) was published by the FDIC pursuant to 
the notice and comment procedure.  See 54 Fed. Reg. 52,399 (Dec. 
21, 1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 20,111 (May 15, 1990).  The RTC contends 
its interpretation of the regulation merely clarified and 
explained it.  The Sekulas claim the regulation was so changed by 
the RTC's interpretation that it amounted to a new rule and that 
the RTC engaged in rule-making.  But we have found the 
interpretation did not change the meaning of the regulation: 
rather it merely explained and clarified it.  Furthermore, agency 
manuals, guidelines, and memoranda are interpretive rules not 
subject to the APA.  See Creighton Omaha Regional Health Care 
 
 
Corp. v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 1987).  The RTC's 
predecessor's publication of pamphlets describing its procedures 
for calculating insurance for joint accounts was clearly meant to 
interpret and clarify the insurance regulations, which have been 
applied consistently in accordance with the publications' 
descriptions.  Because we find the RTC's interpretation of the 
regulation was not substantive rule-making, this claim must fail 
also.  
 B. Deprivation of Property Interest. 
  The Sekulas' argument that they are being deprived of a 
protected property interest without due process is without merit.  
Congress gave the agency the authority to promulgate regulations 
defining the scope of its insurance coverage.  12 U.S.C. § 
1813(m)(1) (1988); Nimon v. Resolution Trust Corp., 975 F.2d 240, 
245 (5th Cir. 1992).  The agency did so and provided notice to 
depositors.   
  V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
